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OPINION  
_____ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 The Supreme Court has vacated our opinion and judgment in this matter and 
remanded to this court.  See Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 
(2011), reversing Guarnieri v. Duryea Borough, 364 F. App‟x 749 (3d Cir. 2010).   
  Charles Guarnieri filed a grievance challenging his termination as Chief of Police 
of the Borough of Duryea (“Borough”).  The matter proceeded to arbitration pursuant to 
the police union‟s collective bargaining agreement.  The arbitrator found, inter alia, that 
Guarnieri engaged in misconduct, but ordered his reinstatement after disciplinary 
suspension.  Thereafter, the Borough Council issued eleven directives instructing 
Guarnieri in the performance of his duties, but he challenged those directives in a second 
union grievance and filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the directives 
were in retaliation for prior activity that he claimed was protected under the Petition 
Clause of the United States Constitution.  Following a jury trial, the jury awarded 
Guarnieri compensatory and punitive damages which the District Court sustained.  The 
4 
 
Borough appealed to this court, arguing that Guarnieri‟s actions were not protected under 
the Petition Clause.   
Bound by its prior published opinions,
1
 this court rejected the Borough‟s position, 
which was contrary to our precedent holding that “a public employee who has petitioned 
the government through a formal mechanism such as the filing of a lawsuit or grievance 
is protected under the Petition Clause from retaliation for that activity, even if the petition 
concerns a matter of solely private concern.”  Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 236 
(3d Cir. 2007) (citing San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994)).  That 
holding has now been definitively rejected by the Supreme Court in this case where it 
held that a government employee‟s claim under the Petition Clause is subject to the 
public concern test applicable to a government employee who files a Free Speech Clause 
claim.  Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2501 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).  
On receipt of the Supreme Court‟s opinion, we asked the parties to file 
simultaneous memoranda regarding the effect of the Supreme Court‟s decision on the 
remaining issues in this case.  Both parties urge this court to determine whether 
Guarnieri‟s Petition Clause claims relate to a matter of public concern.  In the alternative, 
                                              
     
1
 See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1: 
 
It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in a 
precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels.  Thus, no 
subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential 
opinion of a previous panel.  Court en banc consideration is 
required to do so. 
 
5 
 
the Borough asks this court to vacate the judgment of the District Court and to remand 
this matter to the District Court for its reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court‟s 
decision.   
As the Supreme Court stated, and the parties agree, whether something is a matter 
of public concern is a question of law for the court.  See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7.  In 
its supplemental memorandum the Borough notes the language in the Supreme Court‟s 
Guarnieri opinion where the Court stated that a “petition that involves nothing more than 
a complaint about a change in the employee‟s own duties does not relate to a matter of 
public concern.”  Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2501 (quotations omitted).  Guarnieri responds 
that his dismissal was a matter of great actual concern to the residents of Duryea, and he 
refers to newspaper reports of the dispute.  The Supreme Court stated that “whether an 
employee‟s petition relates to a matter of public concern will depend on „the content, 
form, and context of [the petition], as revealed by the whole record.‟”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 n.7).  We are not prepared to hold on this 
meager record that the dismissal of a police chief in a small town can never be a matter of 
public concern in that community.
2
  It might be, for example, if the Chief were dismissed 
because he disfavored one race over another, or because he overlooked actions of a 
sexual predator.  We do not suggest that there is any such issue lurking in this matter, but 
                                              
       
2
 Guarnieri has filed a motion to expand record and file supplemental 
appendix.  Counsel is aware that this court is not the forum to decide questions of 
fact in the first instance.  On remand, the parties may raise that issue with the 
District Court.  We express no view on that motion. 
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merely note that not all dismissals of government employees would necessarily fall on 
one side or another of the rule.  As the Supreme Court itself recognized, it would depend 
on the circumstances.   
This is a matter more appropriately to be decided by the District Court.  We will 
therefore allow the District Court the opportunity to consider the issue in the first 
instance.   
Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the District Court and remand for 
consideration in light of the Supreme Court‟s opinion.  
